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Abstract
This paper investigates whether the depreciation of the euro vis-a `-vis the US dollar exchange rate
during 2000 can be attributed to asymmetric investor reactions to economic and political news,
including central bank statements. Daily euro–dollar exchange rate changes from April 1, 2000
through September 22, 2000 are regressed on economic and political news about the US and the euro
area. The results suggest an asymmetry in the investors’ response to news, depending on whether it
comes from the US or the euro area. Moreover, investors react differently to ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news,
which suggests cognitive dissonance reduction.
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1. Introduction
The possible role of emotions in economic decision making has been recognised by
both psychologists and economists. Thus, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that
individuals exhibit behaviour that systematically violates expected utility theory. Over
the past decade, the implications of their so-called prospect theory and of other
psychological characteristics of individual decision making and information gathering
for the behaviour of financial market participants have been studied both theoretically
and empirically (see Barberis and Thaler, 2002 for a survey article). This has resulted
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(Daniel et al., 1998), excessive trading by investors (Odean, 1998a,b) and the equity
premium puzzle (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995).
More than two decades prior to the paper by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
Festinger (1957) developed the theory of cognitive dissonance, which states that
individuals filter information in order to make it correspond to what they already
believe. Over the past decades, his theory has been applied in economic theory. Akerlof
and Dickens (1982) have used the concept of cognitive dissonance to explain behaviour
in labour markets, whereas Goetzmann and Peles (1997) have used it in studying the
behaviour of mutual fund investors. A related psychological phenomenon used in
behavioural finance theory to explain underreactions of stock prices to news is
conservatism (Edwards, 1968). In this paper, we study empirically whether information
filtering due to cognitive dissonance might contribute to explaining the fall in the
exchange rate of the euro vis-a `-vis the US dollar in the 6 months preceding the first
coordinated intervention in the exchange rate markets by the European Central Bank
and others in September 2000. It has been argued, both by public authorities and in
academic circles, that the depreciation of the euro vis-a `-vis the dollar in the course of
2000 was difficult to explain on the basis of economic fundamentals only. Especially
when the economic growth differential between the US and the euro area started to
narrow in the second quarter of 2000, it was suggested by, for example, Welteke
(2000), Wellink (2000) and De Grauwe (2000) that investor sentiments might account
at least partly for the weakening of the euro (see Fig. 1 for the euro–dollar exchange
rate since January 1, 1999; dollars per euro). The aim of the paper is to assess whether
the data support this view. To this end, we study the daily response of the euro–dollar
Fig. 1. Euro–dollar exchange rate.
H.M. Prast, M.P.H. de Vor / Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 21 (2005) 115–141 116exchange rate to news about the US and news about the euro area, focusing on
whether asymmetries can be found in the reaction pattern. Specifically, we concentrate
on differences in the reaction to US news and euro area news, and to differences in the
response to good and bad economic and political news about these areas. As pointed
out, we have analysed the daily euro–dollar exchange rate changes recorded from April
1, 2000, when it had become obvious that the growth differential started to narrow, to
the first coordinated exchange rate intervention on September 22, 2000. We have
regressed these changes on economic and political news about the US and the euro
area. In addition, we have assessed whether the exchange rate reacted differently to
good and bad news.
Our findings suggest that in the period under consideration investors in foreign
exchange markets did indeed react in an asymmetrical manner to news about the US
and the euro area. In fact, the exchange rate did not respond to economic news about the
euro area, whereas it did to US economic news. This may explain at least partly why,
contrary to what exchange rate theory would predict, the recovery of the economy in the
euro area in the course of 2000 was not followed by an appreciation of the euro vis-a `-vis
the dollar. Our findings suggest that as far as political news—statements by central bankers
and politicians—is concerned, the reaction to euro area news was stronger than that to US
news. This asymmetric reaction pattern may be related to the fact that the ECB did not
have an established reputation yet, and to the possibility that investors may have been
focusing on the political viability of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and not
so much on its economic prospects.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly describes a few
phenomena in asset markets where asymmetric reactions to news and investor senti-
ments may have played a role. In Section 3, the method and data of our empirical
analysis are outlined. Section 4 presents the results and the conclusions are summarised
in Section 5.
2. Other studies of news filtering
In general, economic theory assumes that agents gather, process and interpret
information in a rational way. While this assumption is no doubt useful for building
models of market behaviour, economists—as, for example, North (1990) points out—
can enhance their understanding of many phenomena by allowing for other behav-
ioural aspects in their models. Both theoretical research and empirical evidence by
cognitive psychologists on the processing of information has shown that individuals
exhibit biases in processing information. The behavioural finance literature increasingly
applies many of these concepts, including that of cognitive dissonance, to explain
anomalies in financial markets. According to Kindleberger (2000), cognitive disso-
nance is an important source of herding in financial markets. Goetzmann and Peles
(1997) (see previous section) conclude that the concept explains why investors in
mutual funds judge their own funds more favourably than is justified by the fund’s
results. Using questionnaire studies of mutual fund investors about evaluations of past
fund performance, they find that the bias depends on the previous investor choice.
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tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance.
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Some researchers argue, however, that, even if individuals are biased in their judgement
of information, this does not automatically imply that markets are inefficient. As long as
not all market participants are influenced, there might be room for markets to function
efficiently, as market clearing prices are set by marginal, not average behaviour. Thus,
Jacobsen et al. (2002) find in their experimental study of a political stock market that the
market worked efficiently, even though individual traders exhibited judgement biases.
Nonetheless, as Barberis and Thaler (2002) reason, limits to arbitrage make it costly and
risky for rational traders to fully benefit from the inefficiencies caused by less rational
traders. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), full arbitrage is even less likely to occur
because of the ‘separation of brains and capital’: most traders manage not their own funds,
but those of their customers. Finally, psychological research suggests that deviations from
full rationality apply to human beings in general. Statman (1999, p. 20) formulates it as
follows: ‘‘Standard finance people are modelled as ‘rational’, whereas behavioural finance
people are modelled as ‘normal’’’.
The hypothesis that news filtering may play a role in explaining price movements in
financial markets has been the subject of a number of empirical studies. Ayrer et al. (2001)
find that, during the boom on the stock market in late 1999 and early 2000, new-economy
stocks in Germany reacted more strongly to positive news than did old-economy equity,
whereas there were no discernible effects in the reaction to negative news. During the
period of declining prices after March 2000, however, it was the reaction to negative news
that was more pronounced for new-economy stocks than for old-economy stocks, while no
significant difference in the reaction to positive news was found. Similar research by
Keijer and Prast (2001) also shows that the hype in technology shares on the Amsterdam
Stock Exchange (AEX) was at least partly due to a biased reaction by investors to news
about the IT sector. Their results indicate that the increase in IT-prices following good
news about this sector was significantly larger than the decrease in case of unfavourable
news releases. Jansen and De Haan (2003) study the reaction of the euro–dollar exchange
rate to ECB statements during the first years of EMU. They conclude that ECB statements
have mainly influenced volatility and that the Bundesbank has dominated news coverage.
Another example is related to the performance of newcomers on the Amsterdam stock
market.Researchcoveringtheperiod1983–1999suggeststhatfromthethirdyearaftertheir
initial public offering, the performance of newcomers on the Amsterdam stock market,
measured in terms of their share prices, trails that of established firms, and that in the fifth
year the difference amounts to 30% (Bosveld and Venneman, 2000). Further analysis
demonstrates that from the first year after their introduction, growth figures and profits of
newcomers declined. This is not reflected in the stock prices, however, until the third year.
Hence, investors show a long lag in their reaction to bad news about newcomers, something
theresearchersareunabletoexplain.KaminskyandSchmukler(1999),finally,inanattempt
toaccountforthe20largest1-dayswingsinstockpricesinnineAsiancountriesduring1997
1 In fact, behavioural finance theory uses insights from cognitive psychology to build models of investor
behaviour that explain observed phenomena which do not seem to fit in completely with conventional rational
expectations theory. See for example Barberis et al. (1998).
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only.Theirevidencepointsoutthatwiththedeepeningofthecrisisstockpricesoverreact,as
investors react more strongly to bad news than to good news. They suggest that bad news in
periods of crisis may increase uncertainty and promote herd behaviour.
3. Method and data
Our empirical analysis concentrates on the reaction of the euro–dollar exchange rate
(dollars per euro) on economic and political news. The analysis is not concerned with
explaining the euro–dollar exchange rate on the basis of a particular exchange rate model,
but focuses instead on the impact of news on daily movements in the exchange rate. The
impact of news on exchange rates has been the subject of extensive research, although
most studies concentrate on announcements of US macroeconomic data (Edison, 1996).
Some studies have been undertaken to analyse the effects of economic news released in the
UK, Germany and Australia (Clare and Courtenay, 2000). Our approach differs in a
number of respects as we include statements by central bankers and politicians, as well as
political events, as explanatory variables. Moreover, by distinguishing between good and
bad news, we assess to what extent investors filter information. Specifically, it will be
verified whether they have an a priori, perhaps irrational, dislike for the euro, which would
make them react more strongly to bad news than to good news about the euro area. The
approach used in this paper is similar to the one undertaken by Kaminsky and Schmukler
(1999) (see previous section). In order to test the hypothesis of potentially biased response
to news, we have studied the daily effect on the euro–dollar exchange rate of news in the
period from April 1, 2000 until the coordinated exchange-rate intervention on September
22, 2000. At the start of this period, the growth differential between the US economy and
the economy of the euro area began to decrease and could no longer be the fundamental
factor behind the depreciation of the euro in the period under consideration (see Fig. 2).
From 1 April onwards, increasingly positive euro area news was released.
We have used the electronic real time news of the Dutch financial newspaper ‘Het
Financieele Dagblad’ (2000) as source of information. It has been verified that this
information is consistent with alternative news sources such as Bloomberg. Included in the
analysis are the relevant news items released during the 24 h before the ECB fixing euro
(2.15 p.m. European Standard Time). As far as the relevant economic news variables are
concerned we have included three categories: real economic variables (economic growth,
industrial production, (un)employment rates, confidence indicators, trade deficits, budget
deficits and changes in the fields of taxes and social security systems), inflation and
statements by central bankers and politicians about monetary and exchange rate policy. For
reasons of symmetry, only news items referring to the euro area as a whole and/or to the
three largest countries—Germany, France and Italy—have been taken into account.
Likewise, news items referring to single US states have not been used.
Table 1 summarises the data set (see Appendix A for the full data set). The narrowing
growth differential between the US and the euro area is broadly reflected in the numbers of
favourable and unfavourable news items about the real economy and inflation in both
economic areas: regarding the euro area, there were more favourable news items about the
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The opposite pattern is observed for the US. Table 1 also shows that there were more
statements about the euro–dollar exchange rate from euro area officials than from US
officials. This is partly related to the fact that the euro area, being composed of 11 countries
in this period, simply numbers more central bankers and politicians that may express their
opinionsabouttheexchangerate.Moreover,thedeclineoftheeuroitselfhasoftenprompted
euro area officials to address the exchange rate issue on a frequent basis.
It should be emphasised that these news items may be thought of as reflecting changes in
fundamentals. Relevant information is incorporated into market prices; hence an analysis of
daily exchange rate changes should concentrate on the new information releases in the
interval between the previous and the current exchange rate. Obviously, there may be intra-
day movements in response to news, but we have confined our analysis to daily figures.
Where possible, the announcements of news figures are compared with consensus forecasts
Table 1
News releases on the euro area and the United States relevant for the euro–US dollar exchange rate, by category
Type of news n Favourable o Unfavourable o
Euro area 232 132 100
Real economy 132 88 44
Inflation 38 13 25
Statements and political events 62 31 31
n Favourable $ Unfavourable $
United States 95 45 50
Real economy 70 31 39
Inflation 15 8 7
Statements and political events 10 6 4
Total 327 177 150
Fig. 2. Gross domestic product.
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good news, whereas inflation figures exceeding market expectations are classified as
unfavourable. Statements by central bankers hinting at future interest rate increases are
classified as favourable as it becomes more attractive to invest in the currency concerned,
especially in the short run.
2 Of course, depending on the view of investors on the long run
effects of interest rate increases on the economy, their reaction to hints at future interest rate
increases may differ. However, given that central banks do have price stability as their main
goal—as is the case of the ECB—, or price stability and macroeconomic stability as their
primary concern—as is the case with the Federal Reserve—it can be expected that interest
rate increases willbe announced precisely in times when inflationary pressure isexpected to
continue or increase. These inflationary pressures—which lower the expected real rate of
return—can be assumed to be common knowledge to investors and are already reflected in
the exchange rate, whereas the hint at an interest rate increase is ‘news’. Hence, this kind of
newscanbeassumedtoincreasetheexpectedrealrateofreturnonthecurrency.
3Statements
by politicians interfering withmonetarypolicy arecategorised asunfavourable,because itis
generally assumed that independent central banks have more credibility in safeguarding the
internal andexternal valueoftheircurrencies.Thisappliesespeciallytotheeuroarea,where
the Euro system decides on monetary policy for an area currently covering 12 countries, all
with their own governments.
4. Results
4.1. Which type of news affects daily exchange rate movements?
To examine the impact of economic news and statements/political events on the euro–
dollar exchange rate, we have run a regression of the changes in the euro–dollar exchange
rate (dollars per euro) on the news variables mentioned above. The news categories are
transformed into separate dummy variables. The regression equation is:
ðEt   Et 1Þ=Et 1 ¼ a þ RbiDi;t þ et; ð1Þ
ði ¼ 1;2...6Þ
where (Et Et   1)/Et   1 is the percentage change in the euro–dollar exchange rate
between t 1 (2.15 p.m.) and t (2.15 p.m.). Di (i=1...6) represent dummy variables
2 It may be argued that any statement by a central banker should be interpreted as a hint at future interest rate
policy. However, such may not be the case in all instances, because central bankers also tend to give pep talks and
issue warnings, as is confirmed by their press secretaries.
3 This said, it may of course be that under certain conditions our assumption may imply a myopic view by
investors, i.e. a neglect of the medium and longer term effect of interest rates on the macroeconomy, as higher
interest rates may reduce economic activity.
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political news concerning the euro area, the US real economy, US inflation and political
news concerning the US in the same period. We have also run regressions including
official interest rate changes by the ECB and the Fed as separate news variables, but these
explanatory variables did not turn out to be significant. This may be because they were
mostly anticipated by market participants, and hence incorporated into the exchange rate.
Moreover, there were but a few official interest changes. Each dummy variable takes a
value of +1 if the relevant news is favourable,  1 if it is unfavourable and 0 if there was
no news. For example, the ‘real economy’ variable takes the value +1 if the release
suggests a better outlook for the real economy,  1 if the outlook is worse and 0
otherwise.
This approach implies that all news items are considered equally important, as we
have proceeded from the assumption that the press, in selecting items worth publishing
as news, applies a selection mechanism based on the importance of new information.
Our method enables us to include news that is not of a quantitative nature. Indeed, it is
generally acknowledged that messages by central bankers and politicians influence
market behaviour even if they do not contain figures. Moreover, it should be borne in
mind that our focus is not on the elasticity of the exchange rate with respect to, say, a
change in the trade balance, but on whether the reaction pattern of investors depends
on the news item being about the euro area or the US. However, on the account of the
uniform weighting of events, the dummy approach involves a measurement error,
resulting in a downward bias of the coefficients, and implying an increase in the
standard error. Therefore, the analysis may lead to an underestimation of the
importance of the explanatory variables.
4
Table 2 gives the regression results of Eq. (1). As is clear, all coefficients, except
those for euro area inflation news, have signs that are in accordance with intuition.
Thus, good news about the real economy of the euro area and favourable statements
have a positive effect on the euro–dollar exchange rate, whereas the coefficients of US
dummies in these different categories have a minus sign. Furthermore, the effect of
news about the real economy of the euro area is not significant, whereas that of real
economic US news is, with a 99% confidence level. In addition, statements regarding
the euro area are significant (at a 99% confidence level), whereas those regarding the
US are not. Finally, the constant has a negative sign, suggesting a downward trend in
the exchange rate, but it is not significant. Note that the R
2 is quite low, but this is
customary in regressions of exchange rate models. In fact, the seminal article by Meese
and Rogoff (1983) shows that many exchange rate models were unable to beat the
random walk in forecasting the nominal exchange rate over short and medium
horizons.
4 In general, measurement errors can substantially alter the properties of the estimated regression parameters.
Specifically, least-squares estimates of the regression parameters will be biased and inconsistent, the degree of
bias and inconsistency being related to the variance of the measurement error. An evaluation of the estimates of
the regression parameters in the limit as the sample gets large may show that the presence of the measurement
error—as is the case in our dummy analysis—leads to an underestimation of the true regression parameters if
ordinary least-squares techniques are used (see, for example, Pindyk and Rubinfeld, 1991, pp. 159–161).
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dominance of the US economy on foreign exchange markets. Furthermore, the
sensitivity of the euro to statements may be related to the ECB not having an
established reputation yet, and to investors looking for a pattern in ECB monetary
policy. Moreover, they may regard political rather than economic circumstances as a
relevant factor for monetary developments and stability in the euro area. In their eyes,
these factors are not that important in the US.
4.2. Do investors react differently to good and bad news?
We now turn to the question whether there is evidence that the depreciation of the
euro vis-a `-vis the dollar during the second and third quarters of 2000 can be explained
in part by an asymmetric reaction to good and bad news, which in turn might be
attributed to the tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance. We assume that the
investors’ framework of reference, to use Festinger’s terminology, about the euro area
is unfavourable compared with that about the US economy. According to the theory of
cognitive dissonance, the framework of reference, or the a priori opinion, of investors
is important because it may result in asymmetric news filtering in such a way that the
validity of existing opinions is confirmed. The reason for this unfavourable framework
may be market participants’ fear of political interference with the ECB’s monetary
policy. Also, investors may have doubts about the feasibility of a monetary union
without a political or fiscal union, as well as concerns about the eastward expansion of
the EU. Given this assumption, the theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that market
participants filter news in a biased way, paying more attention to bad than to good
news about the euro area, whereas news about the US economy is treated in the
opposite way. To assess whether this may be the case, we split up the news releases
Table 2
Regression results Eq. (1)
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Percent change in euro–dollar exchange rate
a
Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant  0.10  1.30
Real economy, euro area 0.05 0.56
Real economy, US  0.32***  2.97
Inflation, euro area  0.04  0.32
Inflation, US 0.13 0.67
Statements/political events, euro area 0.33*** 2.89
Statements/political events, US  0.29  0.88
Number of observations 124 D-W statistic 2.02





a Dollar per euro.
***Indicates significance at 99% confidence level.
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value of 1 if there is good news,  1 if there is bad news and 0 if there is no news in
that particular area. We ran the following regression:













t þ et; ð2Þ
where (Et Et   1)/Et   1 is the percentage change in the euro–dollar exchange rate
between t 1 (2.15 p.m.) and t (2.15 p.m.), where GEA and GUS are dummies for
good news about the euro area and the US, respectively, and BEA and BUS dummy
variables reflecting bad news about these respective areas. The superscript e indicates
economic news; the superscript p indicates political news. Being far from significant in
Eq. (1), inflation news and the no news dummy were left out. Regression results not
shown here indicate that inclusion of those variables would not have altered our
conclusions.
From Table 3, several conclusions can be drawn. First, it is obvious that investors
do not react differently to good and bad economic news about the euro area: neither
good nor bad economic news has a significant effect on the exchange rate. Second,
both good and bad economic news about the US affects the exchange rate
significantly, if a 90% confidence level is accepted. The positive reaction of the euro
to bad economic US news, however, equals the negative reaction to good economic
US news. Third, favourable statements about the euro area and the US have a
significant effect on the euro–dollar exchange rate, whereas the influence of unfav-
ourable statements is not significant.
Table 3
Regression results Eq. (2)
Explanatory variables Dependent variable
Percent change in euro–dollar exchange rate
a
Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant  0.14  0.86
Good economic news, euro area 0.10 0.60
Bad economic news, euro area  0.05  0.27
Good economic news, US  0.30*  1.70
Bad economic news, US 0.33* 1.83
Good statements/political events, euro area 0.42** 2.23
Bad statements/political events, euro area  0.25  1.37
Good statements/political events, US  1.54*  1.94
Bad statements/political events, US  0.01  0.04
Number of observations 124 D-W statistic 2.04





a Dollar per euro.
*Indicates statistical significance at a 90% confidence level.
**Indicates significance at a 95% confidence level.
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the sense that the nature of the reaction depends on where the news comes from. This
outcome may explain why the upswing of the business cycle in the euro area starting
in the first half of 2001 did not have the hoped-for effect on the euro. It also indicates
that those who argued that the fall of the euro could hardly be explained by economic
fundamentals were right. In addition, we have found a difference in the magnitude of
the reaction to good and bad political news, which may imply some news filtering by
investors.
4.3. Anti-monde
Given the significant effect of news, notably political news, on the daily changes of
the euro–dollar exchange rate, it is interesting to study an anti-monde, assessing how
the exchange rate might have developed in the absence of political news. To this end,
we have computed the fictitious time path of the exchange rate in the absence of
political news. We have concentrated on political euro-news, as the EMU was a new
experiment not only from the point of view of economic integration, but also in a
political sense. Thus, the ECB has an independent political status, but obviously
national governments may be tempted to politically influence its decisions.
To compute the anti-monde, we have taken the coefficients resulting from our
regression analysis and have simulated the resulting exchange rates in the absence of
political news about the euro area, taking as a starting point the actual exchange rate at the
beginning of the period under consideration. The result is graphically presented in Fig. 3,
which includes both the actual exchange rate and the anti-monde assuming no political
euro news.
Fig. 3. Actual and simulated euro–dollar exchange rate.
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rate would have depreciated less in the period under consideration. Still, the
exchange rate at the end of the period under consideration, when central bankers
decided to intervene to support the euro, would have been only slightly higher in
the absence of political news. Our simulation exercise would predict an exchange
rate of $0.86/euro on September 21, 2000, whereas in reality the exchange rate
was $0.85/euro.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the reactions of the euro–dollar exchange rate to
economic and political news about the euro area and the US. Our aim was to
assess whether the changes in the exchange rate can be attributed partly to biased
information filtering by market participants. Given the nature of the data set, the
results should be interpreted with caution. Nonetheless, it appears that there are
asymmetries in the reaction pattern to news. Investors focus on political news and
central bank statements as far as the euro area is concerned, whereas they pay less
attention to economic news. For news about the US, our analysis suggests that the
opposite holds: economic news is important, political news is less so. The asymmetry
of this pattern may explain why the narrowing of the economic growth differential
between the US and the euro area starting in the first half of 2001 did not cause the
euro to appreciate. Investors simply ignored the relatively positive economic news
releases about the euro area.
We have also found some difference in magnitude in the reaction to good and bad
news. However, in the period under consideration investors did not seem to close
their eyes to favourable euro news while welcoming good US news. Rather, they
seemed to be concerned with the viability of EMU and with the credibility of ECB
monetary policy. This may in turn have been related to the historical fact that
monetary unions without political union did not survive (Vanthoor, 1996). Obviously,
for the markets the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and market participants
needed more reassurance that EMU is viable. Meanwhile, the development of the
euro in recent times suggests that market participants have become more confident
about the viability of monetary union without political union, about the independence
of the ECB and about the quality of monetary management in the euro area.
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Newsitemsrelevanttotheeuro–dollarexchangerate.April1,2000–September21,2000




News item News category
Monday
03 April
0.12 Euro area: trade balance January o  3.8 bn
against o+2.8 bn in December
Ec./EU
France: car sales up 4.2% in March Ec./EU
Italy: industrial production down 1.1% in January,
after earlier announcement of 0.8% fall
Ec./EU





 0.27 IMF: GDP growth in euro area this year 3.2% after
earlier expectation of 2.3% growth
Ec./EU
IMF: US GDP growth this year 4.3%; earlier
expectations were 2.6% growth
Ec./USA
USA: NAPM-production index decreased slightly
in March, but more strongly than expected
Ec./USA
USA: NAPM-price index up from 74.1 to 79.8 in




1.42 Duisenberg/Ha ¨ma ¨la ¨inen: ‘‘upward pressure on
inflation continues to threaten euro area’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: unemployment up again in March;
positive trend continues (Jagoda)
Ec./EU
Germany: wholesale sales up 2.8% from IPP in
February 10.6% against PCP
Ec./EU





 0.50 Welteke: ‘‘inflation to accelerate if weaker euro
and rising oil prices push up import prices’’
Statements/EMU
Euro area: producer prices up 5.7% in February
CPD to PCP; acceleration caused mainly by oil prices
Ec./EU
Euro area: producer and consumer confidence
reaches record high in March
Ec./EU
Germany: manufacturing order portfolios up 4.7%
from IPP in February; rise is much stronger than
expected
Ec./EU
France: budget deficit increased in February Ec./EU





 0.63 Duisenberg: ‘‘I do not expect ecofin to place the
euro’s weakness against the dollar and the yen on
the agenda’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: industrial production in February up 3.4%
from IPP: four times the expected figure
Ec./EU
USA: corporate stocks increased by 0.7% in
February, as expected
Ec./USA
USA: job growth in USA much greater than expected Ec./USA
USA: unemployment in March at 4.1%, unchanged
from February; decline to 4% was expected
Ec./USA
(continued on next page)
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Monday
10 April
0.27 Duisenberg: ‘‘even resumed growth, a weak euro and
persistently high oil prices, will not make the
danger of inflation go away’’
Euro area: GDP up 0.9% in fourth quarter,









 0.19 EC: ‘‘medium term control of public spending in
euro area core nations is below par’’
Statements/EMU
EC: euro area inflation projection jumps from
1.5% to 1.8%
Ec./EU
EC: projected euro area economic growth adjusted
upward to 3.4%
Ec./EU
Euro area: trade surplus increased Ec./EU
Euro area: retail sales for January up 0.3% from PCP Ec./EU
Germany: exports rise 19% due to low euro Ec./EU
Thursday
13 April
 0.41 IMF: favours higher US interest rates
USA: retail sales higher than expected
Statements/USA
Ec./USA
USA: producer price rises above expectations Ec./USA
USA: unemployment benefit applications below
expectations
Ec./USA
USA: continued rise of import prices in March,




0.03 Amato: ‘‘G7 not to make specific references to
exchange rate levels’’
Statements/EMU





0.35 G7 statement: silence on measures to support the euro
Germany: six major research institutes indicate




Germany: wholesale prices up 0.8% in March,
more than expected
Ec./EU
France: unemployment declined to 10.2%
in March, lowest figure in 8 years
Ec./EU
USA: industrial production up 0.3% in March




 0.79 Welteke: ‘‘De ECB to make forceful stand
against inflation’’
Euro area: 2.1% March inflation rate exceeds
ECB norm for the first time
Statements/EMU
Ec./EU
Germany: unexpected 0.4% fall in Ifo index




 0.38 Italy: PM D’Alema resigns
Germany: German research institutes expect
economic growth to decline in the course of 2001
Statements/EMU
Ec./EU
USA: housing construction down 11.2% in March;
steepest fall in 6 years
Ec./USA
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Thursday
20 April
 0.90 ECB: ‘‘weak euro and rising oil prices pose a clear
risk of inflation being pushed up to unacceptable
levels’’
Statements/EMU
Italy: Ciampi government steps down Statements/EMU
Euro area: money growth rises to 6.2% in
March (norm=4 1/2%)
Ec./EU










0.00 France: France wants variable speed within EU




France: February sees industrial production rise





0.00 No relevant items
Tuesday
25 April
 0.79 Germany: industrial production grew much
faster in February than had been reported earlier:
3.6% (3.4%)
Ec./EU
Germany: Duitse inflation levels off in five states
due to lower oil price
Ec./EU
USA: economists project slight fallback in




 1.17 Germany: CPI in April unchanged from March





 0.33 ECB: Refi rate increased by 0.25% to 3.75%




France: producer confidence rises from 29 to 37
points in April
Ec./EU
USA: March sees 2.6% rise (IPP) in durable




 0.85 EC: ‘‘low euro rate no cause for concern’’
Euro area: trade deficit declines further in February
Statements/EMU
Ec./EU
Euro area: industrial production rose again in
February, by 1.2%
Ec./EU
USA: GDP rose by 5.4% during first quarter,
analysts counted on 5.9–6%
Ec./USA
USA: wage cost index up 1.4% during first




0.00 No relevant items
(continued on next page)
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Tuesday
02 May
0.34 Euro area: money supply rose by 6.5% instead of
6.1% in March
Ec./EU
USA: NAPM production index down from 55.8 to
54.9 in April, lower than projected
Ec./USA





 2.23 Noyer: ‘‘further decline of euro should be avoided;
currency expected to recover’’
Statements/EMU





0.38 Euro area: further rise in business confidence index









0.41 Euro area: producer prices rose 0.6% in March
IPP; continued rises for 13 months now
Ec./EU
Germany: order portfolio shrank by 0.9% in
March 0.9% IPP, i.e. 11.1% against PCP
Ec./EU
USA: annual rise in labour productivity up 2.4%
during first quarter, analysts expected 3%
Ec./USA
USA: annual rise in wage costs up 1.8% during




 0.36 Duisenberg: ‘‘common currency under close scrutiny,
prices are stable’’
Statements/EMU
Eichel: ‘‘intervention tool is ever at our disposal’’ Statements/EMU
Ecofin meeting: ministers worried about low euro
exchange rate and point to currency’s lack of
strong foundation’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: March sees industrial production decline
2.5% from February, analysts expected  0.6%
Ec./EU





0.29 Ku ¨hbacher (CB): ‘‘euro not about to bounce back to
dollar parity’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: March unemployment, at 9.6%, dips




1.44 Remsperger (CB): ‘‘ECB set to intervene if decline
of euro threatens to provoke inflation rise’’
Statements/EMU
Euro area: growth set to pick up sharply Ec./EU
Thursday
11 May
 0.31 Duisenberg: ‘‘I will not accept any further




 0.55 France: current account surplus up sharply in
February




USA: import prices in April down 1.6% IPP; first
decline in 10 months
Ec./USA
USA: retail sales in April down 0.2%; first decline
in 18 months
Ec./USA
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News item News category
Monday
15 May
1.31 ECB: ‘‘euro rate too low given euro area fundamentals’’
Germany: retail sales declined again
in March, by 2%
Statements/EMU
Ec./EU
Italy: industrial production unchanged in March;
analysts expected a 0.4% rise from IPP
Ec./EU
OECD: US GDP growth adjusted upward from 3.1%
to 4.5%
Ec./USA
USA: producer prices down 0.3% in April; first




 0.90 Welteke: ‘‘no intervention jointly with FED before
US elections’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: April sees consumer confidence decline
to 20-month low
Ec./EU





 1.58 Euro area: inflation slowdown in April to 1.9%, or
below ECB ceiling
Ec./EU
France: trade surplus increases in March due to
weak euro
Ec./EU
Greenspan: ‘‘alludes to another interest rate change’’ Statements/USA
Thursday
18 May
0.22 Euro area: exports boom in February
Germany: April Ifo business confidence index
to 9-year high at 101.2 points
Ec./EU
Ec./EU





 0.75 Eichel: ‘‘further weakening of euro exchange




1.41 ECB Monthly Bulletin: CB will not tolerate further
decline of euro
Statements/EMU
FT: euro ministers agree on several tax measures









1.23 Germany: Bavarian CPI down 0.1% in May, by
1.3% from PCP
Ec./EU
France: industrial production receives further 0.5%
boost in March
Ec./EU





 0.14 Bundesbank: ‘‘euro still 20–30% undervalued’’









 1.29 Euro area: industrial production up 0.6% in March
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Friday
26 May
1.80 Welteke: ‘‘interventions in support of euro not
ruled out’’
USA: first quarter GDP growth unchanged at 5.4%,





1.30 Euro area: April sees money supply grow by 6.5%,
faster than expected
Ec./EU
Italy: March retail sales unexpectedly declined by
0.4%
Ec./EU
USA: April sales of durable goods down 6.4% from




1.05 OESO: euro area interest rate increase now less
urgent




Germany: first quarter GDP growth up 0.7% CPD




 0.60 No relevant items
Thursday
01 June
0.29 Euro area: PMI below expectations, declined
from 60.7 to 59.7
Ec./EU
France: unemployment decreases to 9.8% in April,
lowest level since December 1991; expected figure
was 9.9%
Ec./EU
USA: mild inflation figures Ec./USA
Friday
02 June
0.27 USA: NAPM industrial production declined slightly





0.83 Fabius: Calls to ECB to refrain from increasing
interest rates
Statements/EMU
Italy: Italian pensions system on the brink of
collapse
Statements/EMU
USA: May sees employment growth slacken,





0.55 Euro area: unemployment declines from 9.3%
to 9.2% in April
Ec./EU





0.73 Italy: pension reform can wait
Euro area: retail sales declined in March for the
first time since 1996
Statements/EMU
Ec./EU
Germany: unexpected strong growth of order
portfolios in April
Ec./EU
USA: NAPM less buoyant in May Ec./USA





1.19 ECB: steps up refinancing rate by 0.50% to 4.25%
Germany: Industrial production in April up 1.5%
from IPP, higher than expected
Ec./EU
Ec./EU
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Thursday
08 June
1.19 Germany: unemployment declines in May, to 9.3%
or below expectations
Ec./EU
USA: consumer borrowing up again in April amid




 1.84 Euro area: first quarter GDP growth up 0.7% from
IPP and rising
Ec./EU
USA: America’s buoyant mood continues,
Bloomberg survey shows
Ec./USA
USA: import prices up 0.6% from IPP in May,




0.39 USA: producer prices unchanged in May Ec./USA
Tuesday
13 June
0.59 No relevant items
Wednesday
14 June
0.55 Germany: CPI down 0.1% in May from IPP, 1.4%
from PCP
Ec./EU
USA: retail sales in May down 0.3% Ec./USA
Thursday
15 June
 1.16 Welteke: ‘‘no interest rate hike until September’’
Germany: April retail sales up 1.6% from PCP
amid slight sales increase
Statements/EMU
Ec./EU
France: record employment growth in first quarter:




0.43 Trichet: ‘‘the euro area economie has embarked
on a period of sustained growth, allowing the
euro to appreciate further’’
Statements/EMU
USA: industrial production rose unexpectedly in




0.78 Euro area: May CPI up 0.1% IPP (up 1.9% from
PCP), below analysts’ expectations
Ec./EU
USA: housing construction declined in May, by




 1.06 Duisenberg: ‘‘no need for rise in European
interest rates in the near future’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: Ifo-index for May at 102.1 compared to
101.2 for April, a 9-year record high
Ec./EU





 0.71 Germany: construction sector landed fewer contracts
in April
Germany: accelerated inflation for three states in June
Ec./EU
Ec./EU
USA: trade deficit slightly down in April Ec./USA
Thursday
22 June





0.09 Germany: June sees CPI rise by ca. 2% from PCP,
level with ECB norm
Ec./EU
France: prices of imported raw materials rise by
7.1% in May
Ec./EU
Italy: 2.7% annualised rise of CPI in June raises
concerns
Ec./EU
(continued on next page)
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Monday
26 June
 0.91 Euro area: industrial production April grew by 6.5%
from PCP, the highest rate this year
Ec./EU
Germany: 1.9% annual CPI rise, up 0.5% from May Ec./EU





0.79 France: May consumer spending 2.6% up from IPP,
twice the expected figure
Ec./EU










0.95 Euro area: money growth in May at 5.9% against
6.5% in April
Ec./EU
Germany: orders for machines up 34% in May Ec./EU
Greenspan: ‘‘US economy continues to grow very
fast, threatening growing inflation’’
Statements/USA
USA: orders for durable goods rose rapidly in May Ec./USA
Friday
30 June
0.55 Euro area: trade surplus in April at o 1.1 bn,
against o 2.5 bn in March
Ec./EU





0.55 USA: first quarter inflation rate much higher than




 0.66 Italy: producer prices rose by 0.9% from April




 0.06 Euro area: unemployment remained unchanged in
May




USA: NAPM industrial production index down in





0.53 Euro area: April sees 4.1% annual rise in retail sales





0.05 Duisenberg: ‘‘economic outlook is better than it has
been in 25 years’’
Statements/EMU
Euro area: highest producer price rise for 5 years
in May
Ec./EU
Germany: favourable development despite slight rise
in unemployment in June (Jagoda)
Ec./EU
Germany: further growth of industrial order portfolios
in May
Ec./EU
USA: leading economic indicator falls in May,




 0.62 Germany: parliament passes controversial tax plan




Germany: industrial production in May rises by a
further 2.2% on IPP
Ec./EU
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Friday
07 July
France: Insee predicts 3.5% GDP growth in 2000
USA: number of unemployment benefit
applications declined in the past week; industrial





0.42 USA: employment grew by only 11,000 persons




0.04 No relevant items
Wednesday
12 July
 0.29 Germany: goods exports up 30.7% in June Ec./EU
Germany: according to Ifo survey, German
enterprises inflate investment aspirations
Ec./EU
Germany: CPI hits 2% level in June Ec./EU
France: CPI comes out at 1.9% in June Ec./EU





 1.58 Euro area: first quarter GDP growth higher than
expected at 0.9% instead of 0.7%
Ec./EU
Germany: retail sales in May up 10.3% from PCP Ec./EU
IMF: ‘‘staff perceives a need to tighten monetary





 0.05 ECB: ‘‘surprised by high wage rises in euro area’’
Italy: industrial production up 2.2% in May from





0.09 ECB: ‘‘accumulated pension promises cause concern’’




USA: industrial production up 0.2% in May from
IPP; analysts expected 0.3%
Ec./USA
USA: Capacity utilisation declined slightly in June Ec./USA
USA: Pressure on prices eases amid increased









 1.46 Germany: Ifo-confidence index unexpectedly bleaker
in June
Ec./EU





0.04 France: IMF denounces French government’s
budgetary policy
Statements/EMU
USA: trade deficit hits new high in May Ec./USA
Friday
21 July
1.55 Germany: CPI for Bavaria increased slightly in July,
to 1.8% annually
Ec./EU
France: industrial production up 0.7% in May from
IPP
Ec./EU
(continued on next page)
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Friday
21 July
1.55 Italy: industrial production up 6% in July from PCP






 0.33 Euro area: industrial production in May up 7.2%
compared to PCP, higher than expected
Ec./EU
Germany: sales prices in May up 2.9% from PCP,




0.84 Italy: consumer confidence rises sharply in July to
highest level in 13 months
Ec./EU
USA: analysts less gloomy about interest rates Ec./USA
Wednesday
26 July
 0.21 No relevant items
Thursday
27 July
 0.01 Euro area: Ifo-institute: inflation forces ECB to
increase interest rate
Ec./EU
Euro area: Ifo-institute estimates a 3.4%,




 1.20 Euro area: money growth at 5.4% in June,
down from 5.9% in May: lower than expected
Ec./EU
France: unemployment in June, at 9.6%, lowest
since 1991
Ec./EU
USA: demand for durable goods increases by 10%




 0.36 Euro area: sales prices continued to rise in June,
though at a slower pace than in May
Ec./EU
USA: second quarter GDP growth at 5.2%,




0.23 Welteke: ‘‘euro exchange rate set to rise in
coming months; the currency is still undervalued’’
Statements/EMU
USA: NAPM industrial production index





 1.32 Euro area: May retail sales up 0.2% from IPP;
for April, the figure had been 1.2%
Ec./EU





 1.25 No relevant items
Friday
04 August
0.03 Germany: industrial order portfolio grew by 0.4%




0.59 Germany: industrial production in June down 3.5%
from IPP, more than expected
Ec./EU
USA: employment declined in July for the




 0.41 Germany: unemployment declined July from 9.6%




 0.82 USA: second quarter productivity rose 5.3%
year-on-year, analysts were counting on 4.5%
Ec./USA
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Thursday
10 August
0.65 Germany: CPI rose 2% in July, against 1.9% in June
Germany: export growth ran out of steam in




Italy: industrial production in June 0.7% below














1.19 Eichel: ‘‘euro has upward potential’’
Germany: wholesale prices jumped 5.8% from









 0.50 USA: industrial production up 0.4% in




0.75 Issing: ‘‘ECB policy-makers fear the weak euro
and high oil price will further fan inflation’’
Statements/EMU
USA: number of homes under construction in July




 0.14 Euro area: CPI in July 2.4% up from PCP and
above the 2% norm
Ec./EU





 1.14 Germany: Eichel maintains that the UMTS
auction revenues must be used to reduce
public debt
Statements/EMU
USA: trade deficit hits $30.6 bn record in




 0.57 Germany: business confidence index down




 0.60 Italy: Central Bank questions budgetary target





1.15 Issing: ‘‘effect of interest rate increases was
neutralised by simultaneous acceleration of
inflation, therefore ECB
monetary policy cannot be called restrictive’’
Statements/EMU
Euro area: trade surplus down in June
Germany: sales prices soared in July, sharpest





0.00 Welteke: ‘‘the low exchange rate poses risk
of accelerating inflation caused by imported
high prices through foreign trade’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: August CPI was down 0.2% from
IPP, 1.8% annual rate was down 0.1% from PCP
Ec./EU
USA: sharp decrease in durable goods orders
in July:  12.4%, whereas  7% was expected
Ec./USA
(continued on next page)
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Monday
28 August
 0.16 Euro area: 5.3% annual growth of M3 in July,
down from 5.4% in June (ref. value=4.5%)
Ec./EU
USA: second quarter GDP growth 5.3% instead




 0.47 Germany: second quarter GDP growth up
3.1%, fastest growth in 2 years
Ec./EU
USA: US savings hit lowest level since 1959 Ec./USA
USA: consumer confidence declined in




 0.62 Ku ¨hbacher: ‘‘ECB not to take real action
until some time in October’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: retail sales down 8% in July Ec./EU
Thursday
31 August
 0.03 ECB: refinancing rate increased by 0.25%
to 4.50%




France: industrial production declined 0.6%
in June
Ec./EU
France: unemployment rose from 9.6% to
9.7% in July
Ec./EU
Italy: July sees producer prices rise by 0.5%
from IPP
Ec./EU





 0.04 Euro area: industrial production down 0.4%
in June
USA: NAPM index declined from 52.0 to
46.5 in August, analysts expected slight increase
Ec./EU
Ec./USA
USA: July: sharpest fall in manufacturing





1.10 Trichet: ‘‘euro is clearly undervalued’’




USA: sharper-than-expected decrease in
employment in August
Ec./USA





 1.27 Schro ¨der: ‘‘well-pleased with low rate of euro’’
Euro area: industry sales prices went up 0.5%
in July,





 0.77 Euro area: retail sales up 1.8% in June
Germany: new orders up 0.7% in July after
a decline in June mainly due to external causes
Ec./EU
Ec./EU
Germany: unemployment unchanged in
August at 9.5%
Ec./EU
Italy: further upward adjustment of 2000 GDP
growth by employers
Ec./EU
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Thursday
07 September
 1.59 EC: commission calls for further tax relief
Germany: strong recovery of industrial
production in July: +3.5 against  3.7% in June
Statements/EMU
Ec./EU
USA: considerable upward adjustment of









 1.44 EU: France under heavy criticism from




0.06 Duisenberg: ‘‘claims that euro rate is far from
bottoming out are pure nonsense’’
Statements/EMU
EU: excise duties on diesel fuel under attack
throughout EU
Ec./EU
Germany: further decline of trade surplus in July Ec./EU
France: CPI up 0.2% in August; annual rate
of 2% is above expectation
Ec./EU
USA: NABE expects robust economic growth




0.46 Duisenberg: ‘‘intervention instrument is still
available’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: retail sales unchanged in July;




0.45 Ku ¨hbacher: ‘‘currency intervention not credible
without US participation’’
Statements/EMU
IMF: euro area GDP to grow by 3.4% in 2001 Statements/EMU
Focus money: ‘‘French EU presidency is holding
talks with USA on joint intervention’’
Statements/EMU
ECB: accrued interest income on foreign
reserves to be sold in exchange for euro.
P.M.
Euro area: second quarter GDP growth at 3.8%
against 3.4% in first quarter
Ec./EU
IMF: US GDP to grow by 3.2% Statements/USA
Friday
15 September
 0.90 Germany: wholesale prices rose by 0.1% in
August, below expectations
Ec./EU
Italy: 6.7% more new orders in June;
+13.5% had been expected
Ec./EU
France: July sees trade balance dip into the
red for the first time
Ec./EU
USA: sales prices down 0.2% in August Ec./USA





 1.03 Euro area: 2.4% annual rise in CPI in August
(ECB norm=2%), unchanged from July
Ec./EU
USA: CPI down 0.1% in August for the first
time in over 14 years, surprised analysts
Ec./USA
USA: industrial production up 0.3% from IPP Ec./USA
Tuesday
19 September
0.18 Welteke: ‘‘the euro is clearly undervalued
and intervention is now a real option’’
Statements/EMU
(continued on next page)
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News item News category
Wednesday
20 September
 0.76 IMF: ‘‘weak euro poses risk to all currency
blocks. Taboo on intervention must go.
There is no doubt now that the euro is seriously
undervalued’’
Statements/EMU
Germany: business confidence went down in
August, from 99.1 naar 99.0; analysts expected a rise
Ec./EU
Italy: second quarter GDP growth up 0.3% from
IPP, where a 0.7% rise was expected
Ec./EU
USA: number of new home construction
contracts went up 0.3% from IPP; first




0.57 USA: record trade deficit in July Ec./USA
IPP-Immediately Preceding Period; PCP-Previous Corresponding Period.
1 ECB-fixed (2:15 p.m.). Sources: HFD, Datastream.
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